Introduction
Against the backdrop of significant geopolitical events unfolding across various regions, including the Taliban’s capture of the Kabul Presidential Palace with Hibatullah Akhunzada exercising governance from Kandahar, the ongoing military conflict between Russia and Ukraine with implications for Eurasian security, Iran’s full membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the growing concerns of potential conflict in the South China Sea, the geopolitical landscape of Central Asian Republics (CARs) has regained prominence for the European Union (EU).
These developments have propelled China and Russia to the forefront in shaping the affairs of Central Asia, the Middle East and South Asia, exerting influence over a substantial portion of Eurasia. In contrast, Western nations are collectively losing ground regarding their diplomatic outreach efforts. Moreover, CARs’ strategic autonomy and assets are now under threat.
In light of these circumstances, the proactive measures undertaken by the EU assume great importance. The EU must support and assist CARs, enabling them to maintain their multilateral foreign policy approach and safeguard their strategic autonomy and assets. This approach necessitates creating space for these nations to grow and develop independently, reducing their reliance on China and Russia’s shadowy influence.
Why is the EU accelerating its diplomatic engagement?
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, CARs witnessed the influential roles of Russia and China. Russia has historically dominated the region, providing security and holding economic power. However, doubts about Russia’s security capabilities have yet to emerge, and its economic decline has created an opportunity for China to fill the void. China’s expanded diplomatic outreach aims to address security concerns in Xinjiang and promote the Belt and Road Initiative. Russia and China have established a cooperative hegemony[1], with Russia focusing on military-political aspects while China invests heavily in various sectors. Concerns arise over debt burdens on CARs and the potential loss of strategic autonomy and assets.
The ascent of the Taliban in Afghanistan, bolstered by solid Chinese influence, signifies a significant shift towards authoritarian governance in the region. Furthermore, Iran’s recent full membership[2] in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) adds to the geopolitical implications. Despite international sanctions imposed on the Taliban, Iran, and Russia, China has adeptly facilitated arrangements that allow them to evade restrictions and promote an authoritarian culture, threatening liberal norms in the region. This development also conveys to the United States and the EU that these countries can transcend their isolation. In essence, these authoritarian states, as highlighted by Jonathan Fulton, have embraced an illiberal trajectory[3] characterized by institutionalized cooperation and resilience.
In 2022, CARs experienced political turmoil with violent protests[4], coup attempts[5], and repressive measures[6]. Governments were caught off guard by public reactions, leading to severe crackdowns. China’s mistreatment of Uyghur Muslims fueled anti-China sentiments. China aimed to improve its image through the China-Central Asia Summit[7] and investment deals. Russia’s aggression in Ukraine prompted CARs to reassess their security reliance. Many in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan blame[8] Russia for the ongoing war, seeing Ukraine as a victim of its expansionist ambitions. This shifting sentiment, coupled with the political and security climate, compelled CARs to reconsider their foreign policy and presented an opportunity for the EU to increase its involvement in CARs.
The evolving sentiment in Central Asia, influenced by the prevailing political and security landscape, has prompted regional states’ reevaluation of foreign policies. This provides the EU with a strategic opportunity to enhance its engagement with CARs, aiming to curtail the escalation of terrorism, extremism, and the expansion of authoritarianism. The wave of protests indicates that the populace is prepared and politically mature, demonstrating a readiness for democratic principles and values.
How is the EU accelerating its diplomatic engagement?
The EU is accelerating its engagement with Central Asia through increased high-level visits and leveraging its expertise in various sectors. The European Union (EU) has exhibited a discernible upswing in its frequency of high-level regional visits since 2022, signifying a sustained commitment. These visits encompass numerous commissioners, defence ministers, foreign ministers, and prime ministers representing EU member states. On 2 June 2023[9], the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, visited. This trend emphasizes the EU’s invigorated approach to strengthening relations with Central Asian counterparts.
Since 2019, the EU has implemented a strategy[10] for Central Asia emphasizing comprehensive, sustainable, and connectivity, cooperation for peace and security in Afghanistan, and regional integration. The EU has become a reliable partner for connectivity, trade, and investment in the CARs, while the CARs provide the EU with access to critical raw materials and strategic links. The EU has allocated $150 million[11] from 2021 to 2024 for regional cooperation and integration. It prioritizes funding for digital connectivity, energy projects, and cross-border cargo movement improvements. The CARs actively promote paperless information and e-logistic platforms to enhance trade and investment with the EU.
Regarding security, the EU and CARs share concerns about the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan, human rights, counterterrorism, and inclusive governance in Kabul. Central Asia-based terrorist groups, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), as well as the potential spillover from the Af-Pak region, pose security challenges for the EU and the CARs. The EU Parliament is considering a more security-oriented stance through mechanisms like the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP)[12] or other monitoring and training missions. This reflects the shared recognition of the severe consequences of terrorism, conflict, and forced migration and their impact on the entire region, including the EU.
Conclusion
Central Asia has once again become a battleground for ideological influence, with China and Russia currently outpacing the EU in terms of investment and security partnerships. However, there is growing optimism as public sentiments in the CARs shift away from the East and towards the West. China has adopted a different approach by exporting its repressive tactics and supporting authoritarian regimes in the region, solidifying its influence through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). One significant drawback of the SCO is the absence of a robust human rights framework and a clear definition of Terrorism and Acts of Terrorism, allowing governments to take excessive measures to suppress domestic protests. This lack of consensus enables autocratic governments to operate beyond political norms. In political scientist Jessica Chen Weiss’s words[13], China is actively promoting an alternative to liberal standards, seeking to establish a world that favours autocracy.
CARs find themselves at a crossroads, navigating the influence of Russia and China while striving to maintain their strategic autonomy and assets. In an effort to diversify their foreign policy and reduce dependence on neighbouring powers, CARs have reached out[14] to the European Union (EU) for active engagement. EU visits to CARs differ markedly from China’s exhibitionism, offering a more subdued yet continuous approach. Leveraging the EU’s global leadership in renewable technology, trade, peace-building, regional integration, and societal development, these visits come with significant policy instruments attached. As China and Russia support authoritarian leaders in suppressing dissent, CARs populace aspires to democratic institution-building, human rights protection, and socio-economic and political reforms. The EU’s involvement presents an alternative path, emphasizing inclusive governance and sustainable development. By supporting CARs in their pursuit of democratic values, the EU can shape the region’s future trajectory, countering the sway of illiberal forces and fostering a more balanced regional dynamic.
Authors:
Amit Kumar is a doctoral candidate with a specialization in China studies at the Birla Institute of Technology and Science, Pilani, India. In addition, he is an Adjunct Researcher at The MirYam Institute in New York. He also works as an Associate Editor for The Defence Horizon Journal in Austria.
Katarzyna Czerewacz-Filipowicz, Ph.D., DSc, is an Associated Professor and Director at the Institute of Management and Quality Science, Bialystok University of Technology. Her research focuses on regionalism, international processes of integration in Europe, Asia, and Africa, energy relations, BRI logistics, and economic impacts of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. She has authored numerous papers and led various scientific projects, including research grant No. 2011/03/B/HS4/05930 funded by the Polish National Science Centre.
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